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Abstract
Do individuals in a position of social influence contribute more to public goods than
their less connected partners? Can we motivate these influential individuals by disclos-
ing how others expect them to act? To answer these questions, we play a public good
game on a star network. The experimental design is such that efficiency and equality
considerations should motivate central players to contribute more than others. Using a
subject population familiar with contributions to public goods on social networks, we find
that central players contribute just as much as the average of other players, leading to a
large loss of efficiency. When we disclose the expectations of other players, we find that
central players often adjust their contributions to meet the expectations of the group.
Expectations disclosure leads to higher contributions in groups that have weak social ties
outside of the experiment. In groups where ties are strong, it has no significant effect.
This evidence casts doubt on the idea that individuals who, by their social position, can
contribute more effectively to the public good rise to the challenge by contributing more
than others. In some, but not all social groups, these individuals can be motivated to
increase contributions by disclosing the expectations of others.
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1 Introduction
Individuals who occupy a central position in social networks can often contribute more
effectively to the welfare of others. Social centrality helps them to disseminate informa-
tion widely and to influence behaviour (DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2010;
Banerjee et al., 2013), to facilitate transactions (Breza et al., 2014), and to take up a
leadership role (Bonacich, 1987; Burt, 2010; Labonne et al., 2015). Further, these indi-
viduals can obtain information, favours and other forms of benefit from their interactions
with others (Besley et al., 2011; Alatas et al., 2013; Banerjee et al., 2014). This means
that they stand to gain disproportionately from the public goods that are distributed over
networks. Because of these reasons, it is often anticipated that central individuals will be
willing to make greater contributions to social welfare than other members of the com-
munity. For example, in policy interventions central individuals are often asked to take
costly unilateral actions to diffuse information, mobilise communities and initiate social
change (Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2012; Berg et al., 2013; Kondylis et al., 2017; Beaman
et al., 2015).
It is unclear, however, whether people are prepared to act more pro-socially when
they occupy a position of social centrality. We have also little evidence on the strategies
that can be used to motivate such individuals to contribute more to the public good.
These issues have important implications for policy. If people behave more pro-socially
when they are in a position of social influence, the process by which these individuals
are selected or incentivised matters little. In contrast, if people do not naturally behave
more pro-socially when they acquire social influence, setting up selection and incentive
schemes becomes important.
We investigate these questions using a lab experiment in the field, inspired by the theo-
retical work of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007). In this experiment, subjects are randomly
assigned to a position in a star network and then asked to contribute to a public good. By
design, the contribution of the centre player benefits all individuals located at the spokes,
while the contributions of the spokes only benefit the centre. As we explain below, both
considerations of efficiency and equality should motivate the star centre to contribute
more than the spokes.1 We elicit contribution choices using the strategy method: be-
fore network positions are announced, each subject decides how much he would like to
contribute if he is assigned to the centre of the star, and how much he would like to
contribute if he is assigned to the spoke position.
During the experiment, we collect information on how much each subject expects the
centre to contribute. In selected sessions we disclose this information publicly before con-
tribution choices are made. A simple model of guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg,
1In our set-up the optimal strategy for a selfish player is not to contribute to the public good. Thus a selfish
player would make zero contributions irrespective of his position in the network. This is a key difference with
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), who study a model where positive contributions can be optimal for selfish
players and where the structure of the network determines selfish play in equilibrium. In our experiment, the
structure of the network only matters for other-regarding players.
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2007; Dufwenberg et al., 2011) predicts that public disclosure should result in a closer
correspondence between contributions and expectations. Contribution levels should also
increase if subjects underestimate how much is expected from central players. This could
be the case, for example, if people form these beliefs through some forms of motivated
reasoning – an hypothesis that has received support in the recent literature (Epley and
Gilovich, 2016).
We implement the experiment with randomly selected adult male farmers from vil-
lages in the Indian state of Maharashtra. Charness et al. (2013) highlight the importance
of collecting experimental evidence on preferences across different populations (Henrich
et al., 2006; Falk et al., 2015; L’Haridon and Vieider, 2016). They further argue that a
key advantage of running lab experiments outside of standard labs is the ability to study
populations more ‘attuned to the research question’. We thus choose a population where
social networks informally provide many public goods (Beteille and Srinivas, 1964). For
example, extension services often select members of the community – e.g, ‘model farm-
ers’ – for the dissemination of valuable information about agriculture or welfare programs
(Berg et al., 2013; Kondylis et al., 2017). To further investigate the external validity of
our findings, we collect observational data on the social connections that participants
have outside of the experiment and we use this information in the analysis.
We find that subjects assigned to be star centre contribute on average as much as
the spokes. This strategy is known as ‘conditional cooperation’. It is played frequently
in games where subjects are equally efficient at producing the public good, and where
equal contributions generate equal outcomes (Chaudhuri, 2011). In our game, however,
efficiency and equality require the star centre to contribute more than the spokes. This
suggests that conditional cooperation is played for reasons other than preferences over
outcomes. One possibility is that subjects only care about meeting the expectations of
others. We indeed find that subjects expect the star centre to be a conditional cooperator.
We further find that conditional cooperation with spokes is similarly chosen by individuals
with high network centrality outside the experiment. This suggests that our findings may
generalise to settings where network centrality is socially determined.
Conditional cooperation by the star centre has a large cost in term of efficiency and
equality. To show this, we compare the outcomes in the experiment to what would happen
if the star centre always contributed the maximum amount. We find that experimental
subjects only achieve about 50 percent of the potential gains from cooperation. If the
central player contributed the maximum amount, 82 percent of the potential gains from
cooperation would be achieved. Further, we find that the difference in payoff between
centre and spokes would be halved if the centre contributed the maximum amount.2 In
other words, star centres have a determinant influence on aggregate payoffs, and higher
2When interpreting these figures, it is important to note that the centre benefits from the contributions of
seven spokes, while each spoke only benefits from the contributions of the centre. Further, when the spokes
contribute a positive amount, payoff differences between the centre and the spokes can be reduced by the
centre, but they cannot be fully eliminated.
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contributions from them would reduce inequality in payoffs. But this is not sufficient to
induce higher contributions on their part.
We further find that the central player is responsive to the expectations of the other
players. When we disclose these expectations, the proportion of star centre contributions
that match other players’ expectations goes up by a significant 11.5 percentage points.
This finding is consistent with a model of guilt aversion. We also document that players
match their contribution to group expectations more frequently when we increase the
cost of investing in the public good, a finding that is also in line with guilt aversion.
Despite the tighter correspondence between contributions and expectations, disclos-
ing expectations does not increase average contributions. We present evidence suggesting
that this is because, in our subject population, the number of subjects who underestimate
the group expectation is similar to the number of those who overestimate it. These find-
ings, however, vary with the strength of the connections between participants outside
the experiments. When participants are weakly connected with each other outside of the
experiment, disclosing expectations actually increases contributions by a significant 13
percent. Conversely, when connections outside of the experiment are strong, disclosing
expectations has a small negative and insignificant effect on contributions.
Finally, we show that our results are qualitatively unaffected if we run the analysis
only on the subjects who demonstrated the best understanding of the rules of the experi-
ment.
Our study contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the
literature that studies the behaviour of central individuals in social networks (Banerjee
et al., 2013; Breza et al., 2014; Gallo and Yan, 2015) and more generally, to the literature
that studies individuals in positions of high influence, such as community and political
leaders (Bonacich, 1987; Komai et al., 2007; Burt, 2010; Labonne et al., 2015). This
literature has emphasised that leaders can increase cooperation and motivate effort by
changing incentives, through ‘leadership by example’, and by communicating required
behaviour or private information (Brandts and Cooper, 2007; Grossman and Baldassarri,
2012; Cartwright et al., 2013; Brandts et al., 2014; Jack and Recalde, 2015; McCannon
et al., 2015). It has also documented cases in which individuals in a position of influence
fail to act for the benefit of others (Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2012). Our results help
reconcile these disparate observations by showing that individuals are reluctant to take
a unilaterally pro-social action (e.g., contribute to a public good when others are not
contributing) even when they have been placed in a position of high influence. This
suggests that leadership works most effectively when leaders are confident that their pro-
social behaviour will be reciprocated
Second, we contribute to the literature on guilt aversion in two ways (Dufwenberg
and Gneezy, 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Ellingsen et al., 2010; Bellemare
et al., 2010; Dufwenberg et al., 2011). First, we present some of the first evidence for
guilt aversion outside of Western populations. This is important to establish as the liter-
ature has shown that preferences can vary widely across cultures (Henrich et al., 2006;
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Falk et al., 2015). Second, we test whether guilt aversion can be exploited to foster
pro-social behaviour.3 Our results highlight that this may be possible when individuals
underestimate what is expected of them. In our subject population, this appears to be the
case for groups that are not tightly-knit.
Finally, we contribute to a small literature that studies public good games played
on networks (Fatas et al., 2010; Carpenter et al., 2012; Rosenkranz and Weitzel, 2012;
Boosey and Isaac, 2016). In particular, Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012) find that individ-
uals assigned to a central position contribute less than other players in a repeated game
of strategic substitutes with an interior optimum. We contribute to this literature by of-
fering a design that is particularly amenable to the study of other-regarding motives. In
our game, there is no uncertainty about the distributional consequences of actions and
no scope for dynamic strategies. Further, the elicitation and disclosure of expectations
allows us to test the predictions of behavioural models, such as guilt aversion, in which
preferences depend on beliefs. We are also able to relate experimental play to the charac-
teristics of subjects and their social network outside the lab. Our results suggest that low
public good provision in networked communities can be due to the low social pressure
felt by individuals in positions of influence. This is an important point because, in social
networks, connections are typically centralised around a small number of popular nodes
(Goyal, 2007; Caria and Fafchamps, 2017).
In the next section we introduce the design of the experiment. Section 3 presents
theoretical predictions and discusses how we test them. Section 4 summarizes the data
from the experiment. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5 while Section 6
concludes.
2 Design
We play a public good game over a network that determines who benefits from the con-
tributions of each player. The network has the shape of a star, with one centre player and
seven spokes. Links in the network cannot be changed and are undirected: if player A is
linked to player H, then player H is linked to player A. Thus the centre benefits from the
public good contributions of the seven spokes. Further, his own contribution reaches each
of the spokes. A spoke, on the other hand, only receives the contribution of the centre
and only reaches the centre with his own contribution. We recruit eight subjects for each
session. Each person is randomly assigned to a position in the star network.
3Cardella (2016) studies whether individuals strategically induce guilt in others. Our experiment differs
in two important ways. First, the induction of guilt is done by a third party. Second, guilt is generated by
disclosing other players’ expectations (as opposed to disclosing the consequences of the subject’s actions).
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Figure 1: The star network
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2.1 Contributions
Each player is endowed with three notes worth 50 INR each and has to decide how many
notes to contribute for the provision of the public good.4 Contribution decisions are made
before the positions in the network are assigned. This enables us to ask players how much
they would like to contribute (i) if they are assigned to the spoke position and (ii) if
they are assigned to the centre position. Decision (i)- we call this the ‘spoke contribution’
or si- is an unconditional contribution decision. On the other hand, decision (ii)- we
call this the ‘centre contribution’ or ci- is conditional on the average contribution of the
spokes. We use the letter z to refer to the (rounded) average contribution of the spokes:
z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. For each possible value of z, the player has to choose how much he
would like to contribute if he is assigned to the centre position and the seven spokes have
contributed on average z. We let czi denote the contribution to the public good of player i
when the spokes contribute on average z. The vector ci =
(
c0i , c
1
i , c
2
i , c
3
i
)
collects the four
conditional decisions of player i. We call czi a contribution ‘decision’ and ci a contribution
‘profile’. Finally, we use xi to indicate the actual contribution of player i: xi = si if player
i is a spoke and xi = czi if player i is the centre and the average contribution of the seven
spokes is z.
The payoff of a player i is given by:
pii = 50(3− xi) + r50
∑
j∈Ndi
xj + xi
 r = {3/5, 4/5} (1)
where, using notation from Goyal (2007), N denotes the set of players in a session,
and Ndi identifies the subset of these players that are linked to player i. r is the rate of
4Players can contribute zero, one, two or three notes. Fractions of a note are not allowed. The value of the
endowment- 150 INR- correspond to 7.75 USD, using an exchange rate of 0.0155 USD for one INR, and then
a PPP conversion factor of 10/3. The size of the endowment is comparable to a daily wage offered in a state
employment program and is in line with those of similar experiments. For example, Breza et al. (2014) report
a mean payout of about 110 INR for an experiment with Indian farmers in Karnataka. The minimum a farmer
can earn in our experiment is 90 INR, the maximum is 990 INR.
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return to investing in the public good. We randomly vary across sessions whether r takes
a low (3/5) or a high (4/5) value.
We comment on a number of features of this design. First, the payoff function (1) re-
sembles closely the standard payoff function of public good experiments (Camerer, 2003;
Chaudhuri, 2011). The only difference is that we sum over the contributions of the di-
rect connections Ndi and not over the contributions of all players N . The main strategic
features of a public good game are otherwise preserved: r < 1 and hence contributing a
positive amount is a dominated strategy. Further, aggregate payoffs increase monotoni-
cally with xi and are maximised when every player contributes the whole endowment.
Second, the impact of a note contributed by player i on the total value of the public
good- r50× (Ndi + 1)- increases with the number of connections player i has. A note con-
tributed by a spoke player generates 2× r50 worth of public good. A note contributed by
a centre player generates 8× r50 of public good. The personal payoff cost of contributing
one note to the public good, on the other hand, is the same for a spoke and for a central
player. This is a very high difference in efficiency.5
Third, we use the strategy method twice. First, we allow players to make a con-
tribution decision for the case in which they are assigned to the spoke position and a
second contribution decision for the case in which they are assigned to the centre posi-
tion. Second, we let players condition the latter decision on the average contribution of
the spokes. The strategy method has been employed frequently in public good games
(Fischbacher et al., 2001; Brandts and Charness, 2011; Fischbacher et al., 2012). It has
been shown to produce results that are qualitatively similar to those obtained using direct
elicitation methods (Fischbacher et al., 2012). Further, the evidence collected in several
studies suggests that use of the strategy method does not influence whether a treatment
effect is found or not (Brandts and Charness, 2011). To keep the design simple, we do
not allow players to condition their spoke decision on the contribution of the centre of
the star. This asymmetry may decrease the direct comparability of the spoke and centre
decisions. However, it does not affect the interpretation of the contribution profile of the
centre, which is our primary object of interest.
Finally, we play with groups of eight subjects, which can be considered as a moderately
large group size (for example, the meta-analysis of public good games by Zelmer (2003)
reports an average group size of 6.6). Previous evidence suggests that in public good
5Increasing the payoff of the other players is very cheap for the centre player. When r = 4/5, an additional
note contributed by the centre player increases the payoff of each spoke by 40 INR (i.e. it increases the total
payoff of the seven spokes by 280 INR), while decreasing the centre’s own payoff by 10 INR. This ratio is even
more favourable than the ratio of the ‘Barc2’ and ‘Berk17’ games played by Charness and Rabin (2002), where
the player has to sacrifice 15 units of payoff in order to generate 350 units of payoffs for the other player. In
the ‘Barc2’ and ‘Berk17’ games, about 50 percent of dictators choose to pay 15 units of payoff to increase the
payoff of their experimental partner. When interpreting these figures, it is important to keep in mind that the
two designs are not perfectly comparable. In particular, in Charness and Rabin (2002) the dictator can have
a large impact on the payoff of a single player, while in our design the centre of the star can benefit several
players by a smaller amount.
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games, group size has a very modest positive relationship with cooperation (Zelmer,
2003).6 A recent paper by Nosenzo et al. (2015) finds a positive effect of group size on
cooperation when the rate of return to public good investment is low, and a negative effect
when the rate of return is high. Nosenzo et al. (2015) document these findings in the
context of a repeated public good game. Importantly, negative group size effects tend to
reduce or disappear in the first and last period of the game, which are strategically more
similar to our one-shot experiment (in the first period of a repeated game, there is no
history of play; in the last period of the game, there are no repeated play considerations).
Barcelo and Capraro (2015) vary group size in a one-shot public good game and find a
positive effect on contributions. Overall, the evidence suggests that in public good games
group size effects are likely to be modest, and possibly positive. We acknowledge that our
findings should be interpreted as applying to moderately large experimental groups.
2.2 Expectations
We ask each player to predict the average value of czj among the other seven players,
for each level of z.7 We do this after the ‘spoke contribution’ decision si, but before
‘centre contribution’ decisions ci. We use α to denote expectations. αzi thus records how
much player i expects the other seven players to contribute when they play as centre of
the star and the spokes contribute on average z notes. Formally, αzi = Ei
(∑
j∈N\i
czj
7
)
,
where N \ i indicates all individuals in N excluding player i. The expectation ‘profile’
αi =
(
α0i , α
1
i , α
2
i , α
3
i
)
collects the four expectations elicited from player i. Finally, we refer
to α¯z – the average of αzi over all eight players – as the ‘group expectation’. α¯
z indicates
what is the contribution that individuals in the network, on average, expect from a player
at the centre of the star.
We elicit expectations without providing monetary incentives. We have several rea-
sons for this. First, we wish to keep the design simple to maximise understanding. Sec-
ond, we are worried that incentivising expectations may distort decisions. In particular,
when we disclose α¯, players may set ci with the objective of making other players win
the reward for a correct prediction. Third, incentivising expectations may trigger hedg-
ing strategies. For example, a player may declare to have low expectations so that he is
awarded the expectation incentive in states of the world where the payoff from the centre
player contribution is low. These are serious concerns, for which there is some support
in the experimental literature. For example Gächter and Renner (2010) find that incen-
tivised expectation elicitation in a public good game changes public good contributions
6 On the other hand, larger groups tend to cooperate less in prisoner-dilemma experiments (see for example
Barcelo and Capraro (2015) and the discussion in Nosenzo et al. (2015)).
7All instructions are double-translated. We are careful to ensure participants understand that we refer to
expectations in the sense of ‘forecasts’, and not of ‘demands’. For each average contribution of the spoke z, we
ask: ‘On average, how many notes will the other players put in the common pot when they play as player H
and players A to G have put on average z notes in the common pot?’. The ‘common pot’ is a physical holder
where players have to put the notes that they would like to contribute to the public good.
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compared to a control conditions where expectations are not elicited. Unicentivised ex-
pectation elicitation, on there other hand, does not affect contribution levels in the same
experiment. Delavande et al. (2011) summarises several recent studies in developing
countries where expectations have not been elicited with monetary incentives.
2.3 Treatments
In selected sessions, we disclose α¯ publicly on a whiteboard. The full profile is disclosed
by drawing a simple table with the value of z in the first column, and the value of α¯z
in the second column. This is done after eliciting expectations from each player, and
before players take their centre contribution decisions. Subjects are not informed that the
average of the expectations they report will later be disclosed to the group. This feature is
important, as it rules out the possibility that farmers misreport their expectations in order
to influence the behaviour of the other players.8 It also ensures that, before the disclosure
of α¯, the experimental protocol is identical across treatments. We refer to sessions where
group expectations are disclosed as T-D sessions. Sessions where group expectations are
not disclosed are called T-ND sessions. For each type, we run the experiment both with a
high rate of return to contributions to the public good and with a low rate of return. We
give more detail in the data section below.
Figure 2 summarises the order of activities during the experiment. First, players
choose their spoke contribution. Second, expectations αi about centre contributions are
elicited. Then, in selected sessions, the average of αi is disclosed publicly. Finally, players
choose their centre contribution. One important feature is that the spoke contribution
decision always comes before the centre decision. This makes it simpler for subjects
to understand the conditional nature of the centre contribution decision.9 As good un-
derstanding of this feature of the design is essential for our purposes, we refrain from
randomising the order of the spoke and contribution decisions. A further advantage of
a fixed order of play is it helps us limit the number of experimental conditions. One
potential drawback is that subjects may anchor the centre contribution decision on their
own spoke contribution decision. However, this is mitigated in this design because the
centre has to specify a full contribution profile, which is likely to discourage anchoring
on a single contribution level. Consistently with this, we show in the results section that
centre contribution profiles that are fully anchored on the spoke contribution level are
extremely rare (about 2.5 percent of all contribution profiles).
8The literature has recently started analysing the possibility that individuals may manipulate their own
expectations in order to induce guilt in others (Cardella, 2016).
9 If the order of decisions was reversed, subjects would need to condition their centre decision on the
realisation of an event that is yet to happen. This would make the decision more abstract and more likely to be
misinterpreted.
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Figure 2: Order of activities in the experiment
1
Decision si
2
Expectations αi
(α¯ disclosed) 4
Decisions ci
3 Predictions
3.1 The contribution profile of the centre of the star
In standard public good games played with the strategy method, individual contributions
often match the average contribution of the group (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Chaudhuri,
2011). This strategy is called conditional cooperation. In our design, this would corre-
spond to the profile ci = (0, 1, 2, 3), or to profiles that are weakly increasing and weakly
lower than the average contribution of the spokes, for example ci = (0, 0, 1, 2). We refer
to the profile ci = (0, 1, 2, 3) as ‘strict conditional cooperation’, and to the second category
of profiles as ‘weak conditional cooperation’.
In standard public good games all players have equal endowments and are equally
effective at creating the public good. Thus, conditional cooperation may derive from a
desire to equalise payoffs or to reciprocate kind actions. In our game, however, the centre
of the star has a number of reasons to contribute more than the other players. First, con-
tributions by the centre of the star reach more players than contributions by the spokes.
As a result, for same cost, the centre of the star generates an increase in the payoffs of
other players that is seven times larger than that generated by a spoke. Motivated by
his relative efficiency, the centre of the star may decide to contribute proportionally more
than what the spokes contribute. This would result in a profile with a steeper slope than
ci = (0, 1, 2, 3).10 Alternatively, he may decide to exceed conditional cooperation by a
fixed absolute amount, for example, the average of the spokes plus one. This would raise
the intercept of the profile.
Second, when all the spokes contribute the same positive amount, higher contribu-
tions by the centre of the star unambiguously reduce inequality in payoff among players.
When all the spokes contribute zero, on the other hand, positive contributions by the cen-
tre of the star increase inequality. Inequality averse players dislike payoff differences of
both types (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Thus a sufficiently inequality-averse player would
choose to contribute nothing when the spoke contribute nothing, and to contribute all of
the endowment when the spoke contribute a positive amount. The contribution profile
will thus be: ci = (0, 3, 3, 3).11
10The number of notes that a player can contribute is censored at 3. The slope of the censored profile may
actually be flatter than ci = (0, 1, 2, 3). For example, if the centre wants to contribute z ∗ 3 for each level of z,
the contribution profile is going to be: ci = (0, 3, 3, 3).
11We present a formal derivation in section A.1 of the Appendix. In the same section, we also present
predictions generated by the models of social preferences of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Charness and
Rabin (2002).
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Third, other players may expect the centre of the star to contribute a higher amount
than everybody else, based on the considerations of relative efficiency and equality that
we presented above. This can create a certain ‘social pressure’ on the central player, which
is captured by the model of guilt aversion presented below.
3.2 Expectations disclosure and guilt aversion
To predict how individuals will respond to the disclosure of expectations we turn to the
model of guilt aversion. We use the concept of ‘simple guilt’ from Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg (2007): subjects experience guilt if their actions determine a payoff for other players
that is lower than what these players expect. We capture the guilt that the star centre i
feels towards the spoke j with the following function12:
Gij(ci, αj , z) = max{Ej [pij ]− pij , 0}
= max{3− (1− r)sj + rαzj − (3− (1− r)sj + rczi ), 0}
= max{r(αzj − czi ), 0}
where we normalise to one the value of a note in the player’s endowment and rely on the
usual notation: ci is the contribution profile of player i, αj is the expectation profile of
player j, sj is the spoke contribution of player j, and z indicates the average contribution
of all the spokes. The utility of player i is given by:
ui(ci, αj , z) = pii − 1
7
7∑
j 6=i
gi ×Gij(ci, αj , z) (2)
We assume that player i believes that each spoke has the same expectations, so that
individual expectations coincide with the group average α¯.13 Thus, he experiences the
same guilt towards each spoke. The utility function simplifies to:
ui(ci, α¯, z) = pii − gi ×Gi(ci, α¯, z) (3)
where Gi(ci, α¯, z) = max{r(α¯z − czi ), 0}. The first element in utility function (3)
reflects a concern for monetary payoffs. The second element is the cost of guilt. If a
player is sufficiently averse to guilt, he will align his contributions to the expectations of
12 Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) distinguish between: (i) the difference between the expected payoff and
the actual payoff of player j, and (ii) how much of that difference is due to the strategy chosen by player i. In
our context, the two concepts coincide as the centre of the star i is the only player who has an influence on the
payoff of spoke j.
13An alternative assumption with the same implications is that the centre feels guilt if he deviates from the
average expectation of all the spokes. In the current formulation of utility in equation 2, on the other hand,
the centre player wants to minimise the average of the guilt that he perceives towards each spoke. These two
objectives coincide if all spokes have the same expectations.
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others in order to minimise guilt. This is easily illustrated with an example. Suppose that,
in this example, player i contributes an amount that is lower than what other players
expect. This discrepancy makes him feel guilty. Increasing contributions by one note
decreases the centre player’s guilt by gir. It also reduces the centre’s payoff by (1 − r).
When gi > 1−rr , the reduction in guilt outweighs the loss of monetary payoff. In this case,
player i finds it optimal to contribute what the spokes expect him to contribute.
In practice, the centre of the star is uncertain about the expectations of the spokes.14
We use βi to denote player i’s belief about the contribution that the spokes expect from
the centre player: βi = Ei[α¯]. In treatment T-D, we disclose α¯. Subjects with incorrect
beliefs will revise these beliefs. Those who are sufficiently guilt averse, will also revise
their contribution decisions in response to this.15 As a result, a higher number of subjects
in T-D will align contributions to group expectations, compared to T-ND. This is our first
prediction.
Prediction 1. Subjects in T-D are more likely than subjects in T-ND to choose contributions
czi that are equal to α¯
z .
The effect of expectations disclosure on the level of contributions will depend on
whether subjects with inaccurate priors are more likely to underestimate or overesti-
mate group expectations. If subjects underestimate group expectations, contributions
will increase on average when expectations are disclosed. On the other hand, if subjects
overestimate group expectations, disclosing that less is expected from them will lead to
lower contributions.
Prediction 2. If players underestimate group expectations, contributions will be higher in
T-D compared to T-ND. If players overestimate group expectations, contributions will be lower
in T-D compared to T-ND.
Finally, we make a prediction about the effect of changing the rate of return to public
good contributions r. The higher r, the lower the cost of reducing guilt. Thus, when we
increase r more people will match their contribution to the disclosed group expectations.
Figure 3 shows an example where gi is normally distributed in the population. Integration
from 1−rr to infinity gives the fraction of players who set c
z∗
i = α¯
z when the rate of return
is r. This is represented by the dark grey area in the figure. Suppose now we switch to
a higher rate of return r′ > r. As 1−rr >
1−r′
r′ , the fraction of players who match group
expectations – given by the sum of the light grey and the dark grey areas – is larger than
it was under rate of return r. This motivates our final prediction.
Prediction 3. Players in a session assigned to r = 4/5 are more likely to choose contributions
czi that are equal to α¯
z than players in a session assigned to r = 3/5.
14In a recent theoretical paper, Attanasi et al. (2015) model a setting where players in a trust game have
incomplete information about the guilt sensitivity of others. In our case, on the other hand, uncertainty is
about the expectations of other players.
15Public disclosure may also increase the saliency of other people’s expectations, raising the weight gi at-
tached to guilt.
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Figure 3: An increase in the rate of return to public good contributions
Density
g
1−r
r
1−r′
r′
4 Data and procedures
We conducted the field experiment in villages randomly sampled from four ‘talukas’ (sub-
districts) of the Indian state of Maharashtra, between January and February 2014. We
selected participants through door-to-door random sampling of male adult farmers. We
completed 49 sessions with 381 subjects: 24 sessions of T-ND and and 25 sessions of
T-D. Table 1 reports further information about sessions and participants. We invited eight
subjects to each session of the experiment. In five sessions, however, we played the
game with seven participants and in three sessions with six participants, as some farmers
left after the beginning of the explanations.16 We show in the balance analysis that the
number of individuals per session is not correlated with treatment.
At the end of the game, participants compile a short questionnaire on their social and
economic status. We summarise this data in Table 2 below.17 Average age is 37 years.
78 percent of participant do not belong to a scheduled caste, tribe or an ‘other backward
caste’ (OBC), 33 percent of them have completed high school. We also find that average
total land holdings are about 4 hectares and average land cultivated is 3.2 hectares. On
average, farmers report sharing information about agriculture on a regular basis with 6.8
other farmers.
The farmers who take part in the experiment know each other well. In the question-
naire we ask each subject about his interactions in the previous 30 days with each of the
16In most cases, famers who left did so early on in the experiment, before actual decisions were made. When
the game was played with seven or six participants none of the rules were changed. In these sessions, the
contribution of the centre player reached one or two individuals less.
17When participants fail to answer a question or report an illegible script, we code a missing value. This
explains the changing number of observations in Table 2. The variable ‘information network size’ is Winsorized
at the 95th percentile of the distribution to exclude a few improbably high values.
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Table 1: Number of observations by treatment
Treatment Rate of return Sessions Players
T-ND high 11 86
T-ND low 13 101
All T-ND sessions 24 187
T-D high 12 92
T-D low 13 102
All T-D sessions 25 194
Total 49 381
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Age 36.817 10.459 20 75 378
Completed High School 0.331 0.471 0 1 375
Not scheduled caste or tribe 0.778 0.416 0 1 365
Land Owned 4.002 5.469 0 68 381
Land Cultivated 3.192 4.846 0 68 377
Information network size 6.719 4.615 0 20 367
Oneness 6.019 1.566 1 7 369
other participants in the session. 62 percent of farmers have spoken with all the other
farmers and, on average, a farmer has spoken with 6 of the other 7 farmers. We also
collect a measure of ‘oneness’ with the other participants. Social psychologists define
the feeling of oneness as ‘a sense of shared, merged, or interconnected personal identity’
(Cialdini et al., 1997). Recent experimental evidence in economics points to the impor-
tance of oneness as predictor of behaviour in strategic environments (Tufano et al., 2012).
To measure this feeling we use the same visual scale developed by Aron et al. (1992) and
deployed in the subsequent literature in social psychology. We report this items in Figure
A.1 in the appendix. Self reported oneness in our sample is very high. More than 70
percent of players who answer the question choose the highest possible level of oneness.
We translate the experimental instructions into Marathi, as Marathi is the most widely
understood language in the areas of our study. The instructions are then translated back
into English, to check the quality of the original translation.
We measure participants’ understanding of the rules of the game by asking a series of
questions before the experiment starts. These questions measure subjects’ understanding
of the network map, their ability to calculate payoffs, their awareness of the incentives
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Table 3: Summary statistics: Session networks
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Farmers with whom i has spoken 6.07 1.66 0 7 363
Average number of days spoken 7.81 7.14 1 30 352
The first variable reports the number of farmers with whom farmer i has spoken on a least 1 day in the last 30 days. The second variable
reports the average number of days during which the farmers spoke with each other, conditional on speaking on a strictly positive number
of days.
created by the payoff rule, and their understanding of the strategy method. Figure A.2
in the appendix reports the cumulative distribution of mistakes in these questions. In
the results sections, we show that our findings are robust to dropping players who make
more than two mistakes in the understanding questions. Following the understanding
test, enumerators disclose the right answers to the questions and give further instructions
if necessary. Hence the understanding level reported in Figure A.2 is a lower bound of
the actual understanding of players at the time of play. To further reinforce participants’
understanding of the game, participants play a trial round of the game before actual play.
The trial round features steps 1 and 4 in Figure 2, but does not include expectation elici-
tation or disclosure of group expectations. At the end of this trial round, the enumerator
assigns temporary positions in the network with a random draw and informs participants
of the payoff that they would earn given their decisions and position.
In Table A.1 in the appendix we present a set of regressions that test for covariate
balance across treatments. We cannot find any statistically significant differences in the
characteristics of players across treatments. We are also unable to find significant differ-
ences across treatments in the number of mistakes made in the understanding questions,
nor in the number of individuals who leave the experiment before the end of the game.
5 Results
5.1 Contributions when playing as centre of the star
Our first finding is that players contribute equally to the public good when they are as-
signed to the spoke position as when they are placed at the centre of the star network.
This is surprising in the light of the considerations of relative efficiency and equality
that would motivate higher contributions from the centre of the star. In Figure 4a we
aggregate the profiles of the star centres and plot the average and modal public good
investments by spoke contribution level. The modal centre contribution is always equal
to the average of the spokes. The average centre contribution is also close to the contri-
bution of the spokes, in particular for z = 1 and z = 2. In other words, strict conditional
cooperation is the modal behavior. Further, in Figure 4b we show the contributions that
players would make if they are assigned to the spoke position, or if they are assigned to
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Figure 4: Contributions to the public good in T-ND
(a) Contribution profiles (b) Contributions
the centre position.18 A signed-rank test cannot reject the null hypothesis that players
choose equal contributions for the two positions (Z=.88, p=.38). On average, players
contribute about half the endowment irrespective of their position in the network. In
Figures A.7 and A.8 in the Appendix, we show that this result holds if we exclude centre
contribution decisions for z = 3, which are most likely to suffer from censoring, or if we
restrict the analysis to the subjects who have performed best in the initial understanding
test (defined as making at most two mistakes in the test).
Result 1. Players contribute on average half of their endowment to the public good, irre-
spective of their position in the network.
We then investigate the shape of players’ contribution profiles using regression analy-
sis. We find that the average contribution profile has a slope below one and an intercept
that is indistinguishable from zero. To obtain this result, we pool the four decisions in
the profile of each player and create a small panel with four observations per player. We
assume that a profile takes the following linear form:
c∗ijz = κ+ βz + uijz (4)
where c∗ijz captures the contribution that player i in session j wants to make if he is
assigned to the centre position and the spokes contribute on average z. The intercept κ
measures the contribution of the central player when the spokes contribute zero, while β
captures the increase in central player contributions when the contribution of the spokes
increases by one unit. If a player plays strict conditional cooperation, his profile will have
κ = 0 and β = 1. Players may choose profiles characterised by other values of κ and β.
However, as they are endowed with only three notes, their contributions are constrained
to be in the interval between 0 and 3:
cijz = min
(
max(0, c∗ijz), 3
)
(5)
18For the centre position, we select for each individual the element from the contribution profile ci that
corresponds to the average spoke contribution in the session.
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In our data corner solutions at both 0 and 3 occur frequently. We hence estimate the
values of κ and β using a tobit model with a lower limit at 0 and an upper limit at 3.
We then provide two-sided Wald tests of the hypotheses κ = 0 and β = 1 and study the
direction of any deviation. To separately analyse the intercept and slopes for the T-ND
treatment, we introduce a dummy for being in a T-D treatment and an interaction term
capturing any additional effect of z in T-D sessions:
c∗ijz = κ+ βz + γ1T-Dj + γ2(T-Dj ∗ z) + uijz (6)
In model (6), κ and β identify the intercept and slope of profiles in T-ND sessions. To
perform inference, we correct standard error for clustering at the session level. We apply
this correction to all regressions reported in the paper.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 report results from the tobit regression. The point estimate
of coefficient β is 0.75 (0.77 when controls are included) and is precisely measured. A
Wald test indicates that this coefficient is significantly lower than one. The coefficient
on the intercept κ has a point estimate of 0.32, which is statistically indistinguishable
from 0. Thus, on average, the centre contributes as much as the spokes when the spokes
contribute 0. As the average contribution of the spokes grows, the centre of the star
increases his contributions by a factor of less than 1.
We provide four robustness checks. First, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 we report
estimates from an ordered logit model of contributions. Point estimates as well as signifi-
cance levels are very close to those of the tobit model. Second, we run a probit regression
to estimate the effect of z on the likelihood that the dependent variable is at a corner
solution. The tobit model assumes that z has the same effect on the likelihood that the
dependent variable is at a corner solution and on the value of the dependent variable
when this is not at the corner. If this assumption holds, we would expect to find that
the coefficients on z in the probit and tobit models have the same sign and comparable
magnitude.19 Table A.4 in the appendix shows that this is case. Third, we re-estimate
the tobit and ordered logit models excluding centre contributions for z = 3, as these
are likely to be the decisions most susceptible to censoring. Table A.5 in the Appendix
shows that the results from this exercise are qualitatively very similar to those of Table 4.
Lastly, in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 of Table 4, we show that these results are not an artefact
of poor understanding of the experimental design. For this purpose, we re-estimate the
two regression models using only the decisions of subjects who have made at most two
mistakes in the initial understanding test. The slope of the contribution profile that we
estimate is now statistically indistinguishable from one, and the other results are qualita-
tively unchanged. We summarise these findings in the following result:
Result 2. When playing as the centre of the star, subjects choose profiles where contributions
track closely, but do not exceed the contributions of the spokes.
19We apply both a lower and an upper limit. To study the effect of z on the upper limit, we analyse the
probability that czi = 3. To study the effect of z on the lower limit, we analyze the probability that c
z
i > 0. In
both cases, we expect a positive coefficient, similar in magnitude to those reported in Table 4.
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Table 4: The contribution profile of the centre player
Tobit Ordered logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel a
Spoke average .755 .768 1.035 1.004 .793 .807 1.030 1.000
(.113)∗∗∗ (.111)∗∗∗ (.115)∗∗∗ (.115)∗∗∗ (.125)∗∗∗ (.123)∗∗∗ (.120)∗∗∗ (.121)∗∗∗
T-D .204 .243 .139 .247 .244 .297 .234 .329
(.302) (.308) (.402) (.391) (.292) (.297) (.363) (.365)
T-D*Spoke average -.096 -.099 -.200 -.211 -.124 -.137 -.226 -.230
(.145) (.148) (.163) (.165) (.143) (.145) (.153) (.158)
Const. .323 -.201 -.231 -.723
(.230) (.482) (.333) (.726)
Panel b
Spoke average = 1 4.73 4.39 .09 .00 2.76 2.46 .06 .00
(.029)∗∗ (.036)∗∗ (.762) (.971) (.096)∗ (.117) (.799) (.997)
Obs. 1524 1376 700 648 1524 1376 700 648
Subjects All All High und. High und. All All High und. High und.
Cluster N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Pseudo R2 .047 .049 .074 .075 .06 .063 .093 .094
Log-likelihood -2274.715 -2047.691 -1005.009 -930.503 -1985.11 -1787.302 -875.442 -811.115
Controls 4 4 4 4
The dependent variable is the number of notes contributed to the public good by player i for ‘centre contribution’ decision z. The first four
columns present a tobit regression, with an upper limit of 3 and a lower limit of 0. The last four columns present an ordered logit
regression. Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 only include observations for subjects who have made at most two mistakes in the understanding test.
Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 include controls for the players’ age, area of land owned, area of land cultivated, self-reported oneness with the
group, and dummies for having completed secondary education, and for belonging to an upper caste. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔
95%, *↔ 90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at session level. Panel b reports the F statistics (and p value in parenthesis) for a
two-sided Wald test on estimated coefficient βˆ1.
In terms of the frequency with which particular profiles are chosen, we find that 48
percent of players select a profile consistent with conditional cooperation. The most
popular contribution profile – (0, 1, 2, 3) – exactly matches the average contribution of
the spokes. Other popular profiles, like (0, 0, 1, 3) and (0, 1, 2, 2), specify contributions
that are both weakly increasing in the average contribution of the spokes and weakly
lower than the spoke average. The profile (0, 3, 3, 3) was chosen by only 1.6 percent of
players. Table A.2 in the appendix reports the most popular profiles and Figure 5 shows
these profiles aggregated in the following ‘archetypal’ categories:
1. Strictly increasing: cz+1i > c
z
i , for z ∈ {0, 1, 2}
2. Flat: cz+1i = c
z
i , for z ∈ {0, 1, 2}
3. Weakly increasing: cz+1i ≥ czi , for z ∈ {0, 1, 2} and the profile is not strictly increas-
ing and not flat
4. Decreasing: cz+1i ≤ czi , for z ∈ {0, 1, 2} and profile is not flat
5. Peak at 1: c1i > c
0
i , and c
z+1
i < c
z
i for z ∈ {1, 2}
6. Peak at 2: cz+1i > c
z
i for z ∈ {0, 1} and c3i < c2i , and
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The profiles appear not to be anchored on the spoke contribution decision. This is shown
in table A.3 in the appendix. Only 2.5 percent of subjects specify a profile where the
centre contribution is always equal to the contribution they would make if they played as
spokes. Profiles where centre contributions equal the spoke contribution in three out of
four cases are also rare (about 5 percent of all profiles).
Figure 5: Archetypal contribution profiles in T-ND
The strategies chosen by the centre of the star have strong repercussions on efficiency
and payoff equality. In terms of efficiency, we find that players capture only about 50
percent of the ‘potential gains from cooperation’.20 This could be improved greatly by
the actions of the central player alone, as we show in Figure 6. The left panel of Figure
6 plots the cumulative distribution function of the potential gains from cooperation that
have been realised in the experiment, against the CDFs of two simulated distributions. In
the two simulations, we hold the spoke contributions constant and change the centre con-
tribution profile to either (i) κ = 1, β = 1, or (ii) κ = 3, β = 0. The vertical lines indicate
the averages of the three distributions. Profile (i) is that of a strict conditional cooperator
plus a positive shock of one to the intercept. If all centres of the star would choose this
profile, players would capture 70 percent of the potential gains from cooperation. Profile
(ii) is a flat profile where the centre of the star always contributes the maximum amount.
If all centres of the star would choose this profile, players would capture on average 82
20Let Π(3, r) be the sum of payoffs that would accrue to each player if every player contributes 3 notes to the
public good and the return to investing in the public good is r. Define Π(0) as the sum of payoffs when every
player contributes 0 notes to the public good. Π(3, r) − Π(0) represents the increase in aggregate payoff that
is achieved when players make the maximum contributions to the public good. These are the potential ‘gains
from cooperation’. Let Πj|r be the sum of individual payoffs in session j with a rate of return of r.
Πj|r−Π(0)
Π(3,r)−Π(0)
indicates the fraction of the potential gains from cooperation that is realised in session j.
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Figure 6: Efficiency and equality
(a) Efficiency (b) Equality
percent of the potential gains from cooperation. These results confirm the important role
of the centre player in generating social welfare.
Conditional cooperation on part of the centre of the star also determines very high
differences in payoff with the spoke players. The right hand side panel of Figure 6 shows
a histogram of player payoffs, distinguishing between players who, at the end of the ex-
periment, are assigned to the spoke position and players who are assigned to the centre
position. On average, the centre player earns a monetary payment that is 200 percent
higher than that of the spokes. This difference could be halved if the centre of the star
contributed the maximum amount of three notes for every possible spoke average contri-
bution level.
Result 3. If the players at the centre of the star would always contribute the maximum
amount to the public good, the participants would capture 82 percent of the potential gains
from cooperation and payoff differences between spoke and centre players would be halved.
5.2 Can we motivate players by disclosing group expectations?
In this section, we study the effects of disclosing group expectations on players’s contribu-
tion decisions as centre of the star. We first investigate whether contributions that match
group expectations become more frequent and then test whether the level of contribu-
tions changes.
5.2.1 The frequency of contributions that match group expectations
Our first finding is that, when we disclose group expectations, the frequency of contri-
bution decisions that exactly match group expectations increases significantly. To show
this, we pool data from T-ND and T-D and run a linear probability model of the following
form:
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match
(
czij = α¯
z
j
)
= δ0 + δ1T-Dj + δ2High rate of returnj
+ δ3
(
T-Dj ∗ High rate of returnj
)
+ eijz (7)
Matches between contributions and group expectations are 11.5 percentage points
more likely in T-D than in T-ND, as shown in Table 5. The effect is significant at the 5
percent level and corresponds to a 41 percent increase over the frequency of contributions
that match group expectations in T-ND. When we add control variables, the magnitude of
the coefficient increases slightly, and the effect becomes significant at the 1 percent level.
We estimate similar coefficients on the T-D dummy if we exclude centre contribution
decisions for z = 3 or we restrict the sample to the subjects with the best understanding
(see Tables A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix). In Table A.8 in the Appendix we also show that
expectation disclosure reduces the absolute difference between contributions and group
expectations by a significant .14 notes, or .2 of a standard deviation. Overall, these results
confirm our first prediction.
Result 4. Contribution decisions that exactly match group expectations are significantly
more likely in T-D compared to T-ND.
We also find that the frequency of matches between contributions and expectations
increases by a significant 11.3 percentage points when we raise the rate of return to
investing in the public good. This confirms our third prediction. We show in Figure A.3
in the appendix that the larger part of this effect (66 percent) comes from a reduction
in the frequency of decisions where czi < α¯
z. This is also consistent with our theoretical
framework, as the extra matches are predicted to come from individuals who find it too
costly to reduce guilt when r is low.
Finally, we present evidence ruling out that the effects reported in this section are
driven by underlying changes in the frequency of matches between contributions and
individual expectations. For this purpose, we restrict the sample to cases in which indi-
vidual and group expectations differ and check whether matches between contributions
and individual expectations increase in T-D. We are unable to find evidence that this is the
case, as shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. Restricting the sample in the same way, on
the other hand, does not change our estimate of the effect of expectations disclosure on
the frequency of matches between contributions and group expectations (columns 3 and
4 of Table 5).
5.2.2 The level of contributions
We next show that the level of contributions is not significantly affected by the disclosure
of expectations. For this purpose, we pool all contribution decisions together and regress
the number of notes contributed on a dummy that identifies T-D sessions:
cijz = η0 + η1T-Dj + uijz (8)
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Table 5: Do contributions in T-D match group expectations more often than in T-ND?
Contribution = Group expectation Contribution = Individual expectation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T-D .115 .122 .121 .126 .001 .002
(.046)∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗ (.051)∗∗ (.063) (.063)
High rate of return .113 .123 .060 .075 .038 .034
(.035)∗∗∗ (.039)∗∗∗ (.035)∗ (.041)∗ (.055) (.056)
T-D * High rate of return -.054 -.067 -.032 -.040 .007 -.027
(.069) (.072) (.065) (.076) (.079) (.089)
Const. .282 .337 .183 .268 .471 .557
(.015)∗∗∗ (.086)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.111)∗∗ (.049)∗∗∗ (.135)∗∗∗
Obs. 1524 1376 922 830 922 830
Sample Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted
Cluster N 49 49 49 49 49 49
Controls 4 4 4
OLS regression. In columns 1-4 the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if czi = α¯
z . In columns 5 and 6 the
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if czi = α
z
i . ‘High rate of return’ is a dummy for whether in the session
r = 4
5
. Columns 2, 4 and 6 include controls for the players’ age, area of land owned, area of land cultivated, self-reported oneness with
the group, and dummies for having completed secondary education, and for belonging to an upper caste. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔
95%, *↔ 90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at session level are reported in parentheses.
We find that subjects in T-D contribute .025 notes more than subjects in T-ND. This
coefficient is very small – average contributions are about 1.5 notes – and, as shown
in Table 6, not significantly different from zero. We find qualitatively similar results if
we exclude players who have made more than two mistakes in the understanding test
(columns 3 and 4) or if exclude centre contribution decisions for z = 3 (see Table A.9 in
the Appendix).
Result 5. The level of centre contributions in T-D is not significantly different from the level
of centre contributions in T-ND.
Why are contribution levels unchanged? To answer this question we turn to the data
on players’ expectations and report two findings. First, individuals do not generally expect
the centre of the star to exceed the contributions of the spokes. To establish this, we
estimate model (6) with expectations αzi as the dependent variable. The coefficient β
now measures the extent to which players expect others to increase their centre of the star
contributions when the spoke contributions increase. Table A.10 in the appendix reports
the coefficient estimates: β is about 0.65 and is significantly smaller than 1, while κ is
positive and significant in the regression without controls, but negative and insignificant
once we include controls. Further, Figure A.4 in the Appendix shows that the modal
expected contribution from the centre player is equal to the spoke contribution. These
results suggest that subjects expect the central player to be a conditional cooperator. This
is confirmed by an investigation of the individual expectation profiles (Table A.11 and
Figure A.5 in the appendix).
Second, the group expectations that are implied by these individual beliefs are very
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Table 6: Does expectation disclosure change the level of contributions?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T-D .025 .044 -.087 -.040
(.080) (.083) (.130) (.136)
Const. 1.489 1.225 1.422 1.141
(.067)∗∗∗ (.223)∗∗∗ (.116)∗∗∗ (.318)∗∗∗
Obs. 1524 1376 700 648
Subjects All All High understanding High understanding
Cluster N 49 49 49 49
Controls 4 4
OLS regression. The dependent variable is the number of notes contributed to the public good. Columns 3 and 4 only include
observations for subjects who have made at most two mistakes in the understanding test. Columns 2 and 4 include controls for the
players’ age, area of land owned, area of land cultivated, self-reported oneness with the group, and dummies for having completed
secondary education, and for belonging to an upper caste. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔ 95%, *↔ 90%. Standard errors corrected for
clustering at session level are reported in parentheses.
often either one or two notes (see Table A.12 in the Appendix21). Consistently with this,
we show in Figure 7 that contributions of one or two notes become more frequent in T-D
compared to T-ND. Further, both contributions of zero notes and contributions of three
notes become less frequent, suggesting that the number of individuals who overestimated
what other players expect from the centre of the star is similar to the number of those who
underestimated it. In T-D the misperceptions of both types of individuals are corrected,
leading those who overestimated (underestimated) group expectations to decrease (in-
crease) their contributions to the public good. The net effect on contributions is close to
zero.
Finally, it is important to note that in the T-D treatment some players contribute above
the group expectations that we disclose (see Figure 7 and Figure A.3 in the Appendix).
This suggests that these players have motives other than guilt aversion to contribute to
the public good, for example a preference for efficiency.
Figure 7: Centre player contributions in T-ND and T-D
21The figures reported in Table A.12 have been rounded to the nearest integer. Thus, a session where, say,
α¯z = 0.55 has a rounded value of group expectations of 1.
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5.3 Heterogeneity
In this section, we leverage the data on the connections between the participants of the
experiment. We are interested to explore heterogeneity along two dimensions: individual
measures of network position and session-level measures that describe the structure of
the network that connects the participants.
5.3.1 Individual position in the network
We begin by studying whether individuals who have a central position in social networks
outside of the experiment make different decisions when playing as centre players in the
public good game. We use two different measures of centrality: (i) the number of farmers
with whom an individual regularly exchanges information about agriculture, and (ii) the
number of other farmers in the session with whom the individual has spoken in the last
30 days. We call the first variable ‘degree’ and the second variable ‘session degree’. For
comparison, we also study whether decisions are related to the amount of land owned
by the player, an indicator of wealth, or by the self-reported level of oneness with the
group, and indicator of psychological closeness with others. For each of these variables,
we calculate a dummy xij which captures whether player i is above the median level of
that variable. We then run the following two models:
c∗ijz = κ+ βz + φ1xij + φ2(z ∗ xij) + uijz (9)
match
(
czij = α¯
z
j
)
= δ0 + φxi + δ1T-Dj + δ2High rate of returnj
+ δ3
(
T-Dj ∗ High rate of returnj
)
+ eijz (10)
We are unable to find any statistically significant evidence suggesting that individuals
who have a central position in farmer networks make different decisions in the public
good game. We also do not find any evidence showing that central farmers are more
responsive to the expectations of others. We report these results in Tables A.13 and A.14.
5.3.2 Network structure
We then turn to the structure of the connections between participants. We are interested
to capture both the density and the intensity of social links. To do this, we compute
session-level averages of the following variables: (i) the number of players in the session
with whom each subject has spoken in the last 30 days (to measure density)22 and (ii) the
average number of days, in the previous 30 days, on which a subject has spoken with the
other participants (to measure intensity)23. As before, we split continuous variables at
the median and create a dummy xj capturing whether a session has a level of the variable
above the median. We then estimate a model of this type:
22This is the variable ‘session degree’, which we used at the individual level in the previous section.
23We compute this average considering only partners with whom the subject has spoken on a positive number
of days.
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Table 7: Contributions and session-level characteristics
(1) (2)
T-D .179 .127
(.085)∗∗ (.102)
High intensity .283
(.121)∗∗
T-D * High intensity -.310
(.150)∗∗
High density .080
(.128)
T-D * High density -.222
(.154)
Const. 1.350 1.443
(.061)∗∗∗ (.084)∗∗∗
Obs. 1524 1524
Cluster N 49 49
OLS regression. The dependent variable is the number of notes contributed to the public good. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔ 95%, *↔
90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at session level are reported in parentheses.
cijz = γ0 + γ1T-Dj + γ2xj + γ3 (T-Dj ∗ xj) + uijz (11)
We show in Table 7 that when networks have low intensity, disclosure of expectations
increases contributions by about .18 notes – 13% of the control mean – an effect signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level. Further, disclosing expectation is significantly less effective in
high intensity sections. For density, we find similar, but smaller and insignificant effects.
Result 6. In networks where participants are not strongly connected to each other, disclosing
expectations increases contributions by a significant 13%.
Why is disclosing expectations particularly effective in networks where participants
are not strongly connected to each other? We show in Figure 8 that, when individuals are
connected by relatively weak links, the most frequent contribution decision is zero. Dis-
closing expectations reduces the share of zero contributions by more than 10 percentage
points. Conversely, when individuals are connected by strong links, the most frequent
contribution decision is three and this too is decreased by the disclosure of expectations.
These patterns suggests that in groups where connections are weak, individuals are
more likely to underestimate what other people expect from high influence players. In
groups where connections are strong, on the other hand, individuals overestimate what
others expect. We corroborate this interpretation by studying, in Figure A.6 in the ap-
pendix, the frequency of contribution decisions that match group expectations in low
and high intensity networks. We find that in both types of networks disclosing expec-
tations increases the frequency of contribution decisions that match group expectation.
However, in low intensity networks, this happens mostly by reducing the proportion of
contributions that are below group expectations, while in high intensity networks, the
effect comes mostly from a reduction in contributions that are above group expectations.
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Figure 8: Centre player contribution in low and high intensity networks
(a) Low intensity (b) High intensity
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a one-shot public good game where subjects are connected by
a star network with one centre player and seven spokes. We find that, when they are
in the centre position, subjects contribute as much as the average contribution of the
spokes. This strategy, known as ‘conditional cooperation’, has frequently been observed
in standard public good games. A key contribution of this study is to show that subjects
play conditional cooperation even when both efficiency and equality would require the
star centre to contribute more than the rest. We also show that the expectations of other
people can be a powerful motivator in this context, confirming the predictions of a simple
model of guilt aversion. Lastly, we document that, when participants have weak social
ties to each other, disclosing group expectations significantly increases the public good
contributions that star centres make. Overall, this constitutes some of the first evidence
for guilt aversion outside of Western populations. Further, the heterogeneity of results
with respect to social ties highlights the importance of having access to sufficient variation
in the characteristics of experimental subjects (Charness et al., 2013).
These findings have implications for policy. First, government interventions often se-
lect particular individuals who are then – implicitly or explicitly – required to unilaterally
take a costly action for the benefits of others. Examples of such interventions include:
agricultural extension programmes that rely on ‘model farmers’; the dissemination of
health information through locally trained agents; and many forms of viral marketing
(Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2012; Berg et al., 2013; Kondylis et al., 2017). Our results
suggest that it would be unwise to expect that the individuals selected in these interven-
tions, who have been endowed with the capacity to generate large benefits for others,
will in fact generate these benefits unilaterally. The dominant behaviour is to match the
contribution of others.
Second, our results illustrate both the potential and the limits of providing informa-
tion about the expectations of others as a mechanism for increasing contributions to the
public good. Guilt aversion can in principle be used to incentivize people in positions
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of influence, for instance by holding public meetings that indirectly reveal other people’s
expectations towards them. However, doing so only increases the contributions of lead-
ers when they initially underestimated group expectations. The evidence suggests this
is more likely to be the case in networks characterised by relatively weak connections.
This raises the question of how individuals form beliefs about the expectations of others.
Answering this question is important because, when individuals are motivated to meet
these expectations, institutions that generate low priors about the expectations of others
can lead groups to fall into a low pro-sociality ‘trap’. In general we do not know enough
about the process through which individuals form these beliefs. More research is needed
on this issue.
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A.1
A.1 The contribution profile under different models
of social preferences
A.1.1 Fehr and Schmidt 1999
We consider a player i at the centre of the star with inequality-averse preferences as
defined in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The player has to decide how much to contribute
to the public good when the spokes have contributed on average z. His utility function is
given by:
Ui(pi) = pii − αi 1
n− 1
n∑
j 6=i
max[pij − pii, 0]− βi 1
n− 1
n∑
j 6=i
max[pii − pij , 0] (A.1)
This player cares about his person payoff pii and dislikes payoff distributions where he
earns more than the spokes or where the spokes earn more than him. We assume that
the player is sufficiently inequality averse, in the sense that αi > 0 and βi > 1− r. As the
players does not know whether there is any variation in spoke contributions around the
average z, we assume that the player believes each spoke has contributed exactly z and
earns the same payoff pij . The utility function thus becomes:
Ui(pi) = pii − αi max[pij − pii, 0]− βi max[pii − pij , 0]
We now show that the optimal contribution profile for this player is (0, 3, 3, 3). Let us
normalise the value of each note to 1. The payoff of the centre of the star is given by:
pii = 3 − (1 − r)czi + 7rz. The payoff of a spoke j is given by pij = 3 − (1 − r)z + rczi ,
and the difference between the two is pii − pij = (6r + 1)z − czi . Thus the centre has a
higher payoff than the spokes if (6r + 1)z > czi , and the spokes have a higher payoff if
(6r + 1)z < czi . Our proof proceeds in two steps.
1. Consider the case where z ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In this case, as r is at least 3/5, pii > pij
irrespective of czi . In other words, the centre can decrease but not erase advantageous
inequality. The centre player utility is now given by:
Ui(pi) = pii − βi(pii − pij)
= 3− (1− r)czi + 7rz − βi ((6r + 1)z − czi )
= 3 + (βi − (1− r))czi + (7r − βi (6r + 1)) z.
As βi > (1 − r), utility monotonically increases with contributions and is maximised
by choosing the maximum amount of contributions: czi = 3.
2. Consider the case where z = 0. The difference between spoke and centre payoff
is now given by pij − pii = c0i , which implies the spoke payoff is weakly greater than the
payoff of the centre. In this case, the centre player utility is given by:
Ui(pi) = pii − αi(pij − pii)
= 3− (1− r)c0i − αic0i .
Utility now monotonically decreases with contributions and is maximised by setting
c0i = 0.
A.2
A.1.2 Bolton and Ockenfels 2000
We now turn to the concept of aversion to relative inequality proposed by Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000). As in the previous subsection we consider the contribution choice of
the centre player for four possible values of the average spoke contribution. Given this,
for simplicity of exposition, we consider the following additively separable preference
function:
Ui(pi) = pii − αi
(
σi − 1
8
)2
(A.2)
where σi = pii∑8
k=1 pik
if
∑8
k=1 pik > 0, and σi = 1/8 if
∑8
k=1 pik = 0. As before it is
immediately apparent that when z = 0 the utility of the centre player is maximized by
setting c0i = 0: not only does setting c
0
i > 0 reduce pii, it also increases inequality.
Now consider the case where z = {1, 2, 3}. The centre player utility is now given by:
Ui(pi) = pii − αi
(
pii
pii + 7pij
− 1
8
)2
= pii − αi
(
1
1 + 7
pij
pii
− 1
8
)2
As before, when z = {1, 2, 3}, pii > pij irrespective of the centre player contribution. This
implies that 1
1+7
pij
pii
< 18 . The centre player can increase the ratio
pij
pii
by contributing more
to the public good. Thus, for a large enough αi, the star centre will always select the value
of czi that yields the largest possible value of
pij
pii
i.e., he will set czi = 3 for z = {1, 2, 3}.
For intermediate levels of αi, other profiles are also possible. This is due to the non-linear
impact of relative inequality on utility in the model. For example, when αi = 8.5 and
r = 35 , the optimal contribution profile is {0, 2, 3, 3}.
A.1.3 Charness and Rabin 2002
We now turn to the concept of inequality aversion proposed by Charness and Rabin
(2002). The preferences of the centre of the star are now written:
Ui(pi) = (1− ρit− σis− θiq)pii + (ρit+ σis+ θiq)pij (A.3)
where t = 1 if pii > pij and 0 otherwise, s = 1 if pii < pij and 0 otherwise, and q = −1
if j has misbehaved and 0 otherwise. Further, as before, we assume that the centre
believes that each spoke has contributed exactly z and thus earns the same payoff pij .
Parameters ρi and σi can be positive or negative, depending on preferences. Inequality
aversion (or difference aversion as defined by Charness and Rabin) is captured by setting
σi < 0 < ρi < 1, which we now assume. To focus only on inequality aversion, we also
assume that θi = 0, i.e., subjects do not have normative preferences regarding spokes’
contributions.
Let us first consider the case where z = 0. If c0i = 0, pij = pii and thus t = s = 0. The
value of the utility function is simply pii. In contrast, for c0i > 0, we have pii < pij and thus
s = 1 and t = 0. Utility is now given by:
A.3
Ui(pi) = (1− σi)pii + σipij
= pii + σi(pij − pii).
This is strictly less than pii as σi < 0 and pij > pii. It follows that c0i = 0 is the optimal
action for a player with preferences given by A.3.
Let us now consider the case where z = {1, 2, 3}. In this case, for any level of contri-
bution by the centre of the star, pii > pij , and thus t = 1 and s = 0. Utility is now given
by:
Ui(pi) = (1− ρi)pii + ρipij
= pii − ρi(pii − pij)
This is resembles very closely the analysis for z = {1, 2, 3} and Fehr and Schmidt
preferences (the only difference is that the inequality aversion parameter is called ρi
instead of βi). Thus, as before, if ρi > 1− r, czi = 3 will be optimal for z = {1, 2, 3}.
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A.2 Figures
Figure A.1: Oneness question
A.5
Figure A.2: Cumulative distribution of mistakes
A.6
Figure A.3: Match between contribution and group expectations. T-D treatment.
A.7
Figure A.4: Expectation profiles in T-ND
A.8
Figure A.5: Archetypal expectation profiles in T-ND
A.9
Figure A.6: Match between contributions and expectations in low and high intensity net-
works
(a) Low intensity
(b) High intensity
A.10
Figure A.7: Contributions to the public good in T-ND (Excluding centre contributions for
z = 3).
A.11
Figure A.8: Contributions to the public good in T-ND. High understanding players
(a) Contribution profiles (b) Contributions
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A.3 Tables
Table A.1: Balance test
Age UpperCaste HigherEdu LandOwned LandCult NetSize Oneness Understanding SessionN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
T1 -.605 .099 -.019 -.785 -.177 -.624 -.169 .099 -.032
(1.427) (.072) (.070) (.600) (.554) (.709) (.229) (.254) (.159)
Const. 37.123 .728 .341 4.402 3.283 7.039 6.106 2.818 7.792
(1.049)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗ (.050)∗∗∗ (.508)∗∗∗ (.440)∗∗∗ (.485)∗∗∗ (.149)∗∗∗ (.190)∗∗∗ (.120)∗∗∗
Obs. 378 365 375 381 377 367 369 381 49
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is indicated in the row’s name. ‘HigherEdu’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
respondent has completed secondary school. ‘Upper caste’ is a variable that takes value of 1 if respondent is not from a schedule caste, a
scheduled tribe or an Other Backward Caste. ‘LandCult’ is the area of land cultivated in hectares. ‘Degree’ is the self reported number of
peers with whom the farmer exchanges advice on agricultural matters. ‘Oneness’ is a number from 1 to 7. Higher numbers reflect an
increasing feeling of oneness. ‘Understanding’ refers to the number of mistakes in the initial understanding questions. The last column is a
regression over a session level outcome-‘SessionN’- the number of participants in each session. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔ 95%, *↔
90%. Standard errors clustered at the session level reported in parentheses in columns 1-8. Robust standard errors are reported for the
regression in column 9.
Table A.2: Most frequently chosen contribution profiles in T-ND. All players
Contribution profile ci Percentage
0123 19.3
0013 5.9
3210 3.7
0122 3.2
0000 2.7
0012 2.7
0223 2.1
1233 2.1
3123 2.1
A strategy is indicated by a four digit code. Code 0123, for example, indicates the strategy where player i
chooses: c0i = 0, c
1
i = 1, c
2
i = 2 and c
3
i = 3. We only include strategies played by at least 2 percent of the
players in T-ND.
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Table A.3: Do players anchor the centre contribution on the spoke contribution?∑4
z=0 c
z
i = si Percentage
0 19.25
1 55.61
2 17.11
3 5.35
4 2.67
Data from T-ND.
Table A.4: Robustness of tobit assumption
Dependent var: czi > 0 Dependent var: c
z
i = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spoke average .450 .451 .263 .267
(.065)∗∗∗ (.065)∗∗∗ (.059)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗∗
T-D .232 .248 -.103 -.089
(.152) (.159) (.172) (.176)
T-D * Spoke average -.002 .001 -.019 -.015
(.091) (.095) (.076) (.077)
Const. -.016 -.232 -1.052 -1.357
(.107) (.340) (.121)∗∗∗ (.249)∗∗∗
Obs. 1524 1376 1524 1376
Cluster N 49 49 49 49
Pseudo R2 .116 .127 .041 .044
Log-likelihood -751.012 -668.857 -810.307 -736.547
Probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable described in the heading of each column. Columns 2 and 4 restrict the
analysis to players who have made at most two mistakes in the initial understanding questions. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔ 95%, *↔
90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at session level are reported in parentheses.
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Table A.5: The contribution profile of the centre player (Excluding centre contributions for
z = 3)
Tobit Ordered logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel a
Spoke average .599 .590 .725 .723
(.115)∗∗∗ (.120)∗∗∗ (.147)∗∗∗ (.155)∗∗∗
T-D .084 .102 .144 .177
(.298) (.309) (.325) (.339)
T-D * Spoke average .056 .089 .010 .039
(.162) (.172) (.182) (.194)
Const. .471 -.277
(.217)∗∗ (.514)
Panel b
Spoke average = 1 12.22 11.78 3.53 3.2
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.06)∗ (.074)∗
Obs. 1143 1032 1143 1032
Cluster N 49 49 49 49
Pseudo R2 .026 .032 .036 .044
Log-likelihood -1728.528 -1551.97 -1502.468 -1347.93
Controls 4 4
The dependent variable is the number of notes contributed to the public good by player i for ‘centre contribution’ decision z. The first two
columns present a tobit regression, with an upper limit of 3 and a lower limit of 0. The last two columns present an ordered logit
regression. Columns 2 and 4 include controls for the players’ age, area of land owned, area of land cultivated, self-reported oneness with
the group, and dummies for having completed secondary education, and for belonging to an upper caste. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔
95%, *↔ 90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at session level. Panel b reports the F statistics (and p value in parenthesis) for a
two-sided Wald test on estimated coefficient βˆ1.
Table A.6: Do contributions in T-D match group expectations more often than in T-ND?
(Excluding centre contributions for z = 3)
Contribution = Group expectation Contribution = Individual expectation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T-D .115 .119 .121 .126 .001 .002
(.058)∗∗ (.059)∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗ (.051)∗∗ (.063) (.063)
High rate of return .082 .092 .060 .075 .038 .034
(.042)∗ (.047)∗ (.035)∗ (.041)∗ (.055) (.056)
T-D * High rate of return -.023 -.041 -.032 -.040 .007 -.027
(.078) (.084) (.065) (.076) (.079) (.089)
Const. .290 .345 .183 .268 .471 .557
(.027)∗∗∗ (.084)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.111)∗∗ (.049)∗∗∗ (.135)∗∗∗
Obs. 1143 1032 922 830 922 830
Sample Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted
Cluster N 49 49 49 49 49 49
Controls 4 4 4
OLS regression. In columns 1-4 the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if czi = α¯
z . In columns 5 and 6 the
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if czi = α
z
i . ‘High rate of return’ is a dummy for whether in the session
r = 4
5
. Columns 2, 4 and 6 include controls for the players’ age, area of land owned, area of land cultivated, self-reported oneness with
the group, and dummies for having completed secondary education, and for belonging to an upper caste. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔
95%, *↔ 90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at session level are reported in parentheses.
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Table A.7: Do contributions in T-D match group expectations more often than in T-ND? (High
understanding subjects)
Contribution = Group expectation Contribution = Individual expectation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T-D .102 .093 .107 .111 .068 .063
(.078) (.072) (.065)∗ (.064)∗ (.087) (.090)
High rate of return .106 .103 -.008 .010 .123 .129
(.051)∗∗ (.056)∗ (.058) (.062) (.071)∗ (.080)
T-D * High rate of return -.018 -.004 .059 .073 -.152 -.216
(.106) (.111) (.108) (.119) (.137) (.161)
Const. .311 .409 .197 .328 .462 .322
(.027)∗∗∗ (.125)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.134)∗∗ (.063)∗∗∗ (.219)
Obs. 700 648 416 384 416 384
Sample Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted
Cluster N 49 49 49 49 49 49
Controls 4 4 4
OLS regression. Only observations from subjects who have made at most two mistakes in the understanding tests are included. In
columns 1-4 the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if czi = α¯
z . In columns 5 and 6 the dependent variable is
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if czi = α
z
i . ‘High rate of return’ is a dummy for whether in the session r =
4
5
. Columns 2, 4 and
6 include controls for the players’ age, area of land owned, area of land cultivated, self-reported oneness with the group, and dummies for
having completed secondary education, and for belonging to an upper caste. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔ 95%, *↔ 90%. Standard
errors corrected for clustering at session level are reported in parentheses.
Table A.8: Absolute difference between contributions and group expectations
Absolute difference
(1) (2)
T-D -.136 -.144
(.069)∗∗ (.071)∗∗
High rate of return -.136 -.148
(.053)∗∗ (.059)∗∗
T-D * High rate of return .040 .067
(.097) (.102)
Const. .903 .682
(.031)∗∗∗ (.136)∗∗∗
Obs. 1524 1376
Cluster N 49 49
Controls 4
OLS regression. Columns 2 includes controls for the players’ age, area of land owned, area of land cultivated, self-reported oneness with
the group, and dummies for having completed secondary education, and for belonging to an upper caste. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔
95%, *↔ 90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at session level are reported in parentheses.
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Table A.9: Does expectation disclosure change the level of contributions? (Excluding centre
contributions for z = 3)
t1 t2
(1) (2)
T-D .064 .094
(.095) (.098)
Const. 1.278 .846
(.075)∗∗∗ (.273)∗∗∗
Obs. 1143 1032
Cluster N 49 49
Controls 4
OLS regression. The dependent variable is the number of notes contributed to the public good. Column 2 includes controls for the players’
age, area of land owned, area of land cultivated, self-reported oneness with the group, and dummies for having completed secondary
education, and for belonging to an upper caste. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔ 95%, *↔ 90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at
session level are reported in parentheses.
Table A.10: Expectations about the contribution of the centre player
Tobit Ordered logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel a
Spoke average .659 .637 .700 .679
(.087)∗∗∗ (.092)∗∗∗ (.098)∗∗∗ (.103)∗∗∗
T-D -.057 -.068 -.090 -.102
(.247) (.260) (.250) (.260)
T-D*Spoke average .037 .084 .047 .093
(.121) (.127) (.120) (.126)
Const. .445 -.449
(.171)∗∗∗ (.412)
Panel b
Spoke average = 1 15.45 15.56 9.44 9.73
(.000)∗∗∗ (.000)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Obs. 1524 1376 1524 1376
Cluster N 49 49 49 49
Pseudo R2 .048 .052 .061 .065
Log-likelihood -2274.73 -2044.976 -1980.611 -1781.251
Controls 4 4
The dependent variable is expectation αzi . The first two columns present a tobit regression, with an upper limit of 3 and a lower limit of 0.
The last two columns present an ordered logit regression. Columns 2 and 4 include controls for the players’ age, area of land owned, area
of land cultivated, self-reported oneness with the group, and dummies for having completed secondary education, and for belonging to an
upper caste. Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔ 95%, *↔ 90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at session level. Panel b reports the F
statistics (and p value in parenthesis) for a two-sided Wald test on estimated coefficient βˆ1.
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Table A.11: Most frequently chosen expectation profiles in T-ND. All players
Expectation profile αi Percentage
0123 13.4
0013 4.8
0012 4.3
0112 2.7
0212 2.1
0213 2.1
3122 2.1
3123 2.1
3210 2.1
3223 2.1
An expectation profile is indicated by a four digit code. Code 0123, for example, indicates the expectation
profile where player i chooses: α0i = 0, α
1
i = 1, α
2
i = 2 and α
3
i = 3. We only include expectation profiles
chosen by at least 2 percent of players.
Table A.12: Group expectations by spoke contribution
Percentage of sessions where
α¯z = 0 α¯z = 1 α¯z = 2 α¯z = 3
z = 0 24 60 16 0
z = 1 0 76 24 0
z = 2 0 40 60 0
z = 3 0 16 68 16
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Table A.13: Contributions and player characteristics
Degree Session degree Oneness Land owned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spoke average .705 .697 .705 .750 .705 .736 .705 .824
(.071)∗∗∗ (.103)∗∗∗ (.071)∗∗∗ (.085)∗∗∗ (.071)∗∗∗ (.121)∗∗∗ (.071)∗∗∗ (.105)∗∗∗
Degree -.077 -.097
(.121) (.221)
Degree * Spoke Average .013
(.120)
Session degree .044 .150
(.142) (.273)
Session degree * spoke average -.069
(.114)
Oneness -.024 .052
(.100) (.250)
Oneness * spoke average -.050
(.138)
Land owned -.184 .168
(.112)∗ (.222)
Land owned * spoke average -.232
(.127)∗
Const. .477 .489 .400 .332 .444 .397 .523 .344
(.154)∗∗∗ (.191)∗∗ (.167)∗∗ (.205) (.154)∗∗∗ (.223)∗ (.164)∗∗∗ (.208)∗
Obs. 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524
Cluster N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Pseudo R2 .047 .047 .046 .047 .046 .046 .047 .048
Log-likelihood -2275.133 -2275.125 -2275.318 -2275.068 -2275.378 -2275.242 -2273.761 -2270.689
Tobit regression, with an upper limit of 3 and a lower limit of 0. The dependent variable is contributions αci . Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **
↔ 95%, *↔ 90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at session level.
Table A.14: Match between contributions and expectations, and player characteristics
Degree Session degree Oneness Land owned
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Degree .011
(.027)
Session degree .035
(.033)
Oneness -.029
(.027)
Land owned -.017
(.032)
Const. .275 .261 .297 .292
(.025)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗
Obs. 1524 1524 1524 1524
Cluster N 49 49 49 49
OLS regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if czi = α¯
z . Confidence: ***↔ 99%, **↔ 95%, *↔
90%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at session level.
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